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1» Even a cursory acquaintance with Panama's recent history will reveal 
the predominant role which her canal has played in shaping her economic 
destiny* For although legally a special treaty gives the United States 
authorities control over the ten mile wide strip through which the canal 
runs (»'the Canal Zone")» the geographical and economic ties between this 
Interoceani.c water-way and the Republic of Panama have always transcended 
all legal and international considerations* Small in terms both of 
territory (29,000 sq. miles) and population (about 310,000 in 1914 when 
the canal was completed and only 1*3 million now) and endowed with no 
outstanding natural resources, Panama understandably looked on the canal 
as a major, source of employment and trade« From the outset, therefore, 
the canal overshadowed everything else in the young Republic and as 
Panamanian society evolved it became basically and permanently divided 
into two groups* a static and self»contained rural community, and an urban 
community dependent in different ways on the canal and the activities which 
It engendered* 
2* this seems to have worked out fairly satisfactorily in the inter-war 
years; but World War II and its aftermath have disclosed the weaknesses 
inherent in such a situation* For at one point during the war the canal 
had reportedly accounted for 30-35 per cent of the national income, and 
employed not less than 40,000 people* The repercussions on the level of 
income, savings and consumption were true to scale* By reference to the 
figures for 1939, public income had by 1946 increased almost 2/5 times and 
demand deposits multiplied eightfold, and total imports scored a record 
increase of 175 per cent* 
3* With the return of peace and the consequent reduction of United 
States military expenditure the situation was drastically altered and the 
country was confronted with sizeable unemployment* From a war-time peak 
of 40,000 persons employed in the Canal Zone, the figure dropped to 18,000 
in 1950; and the usual repercussions followed; between 1945 and 1951 the 




goods to the zone dropped from 97*6 to 40*1 million balboas; and the 
countryTs import capacity declined from 131»7 to a mere 70 million balboas. 
However, the existence of surplus liquidity in the economy together with 
substantial pent-up demand, so characteristic of post-war years, tempo-
rarily obviated large-scale unemployment; but a central government mounting 
deficit was to precipitate the crisis* Hot only was surplus liquidity 
wiped out; but since Panama's domestic currency and its international 
reserves were one and the same thing and the latter were used up in financing 
the countryTs imports, an acute shortage of money supply developed culmi-
nating eventually in a balance of payments deficit of some 75 million 
balboas (1946-50). By the end of 1950 the number of the unemployed had 
reached nearly 13,400 in Panama district and more than 4,500 in Colon 
district. These figures reportedly represented some 17 and 19 per cent 
of the economically active population in the two districts respectively. 
4. Before long, however, various circumstances combined to put the 
economy on the way to recovery. These need not detain us at this point« 
What is essential to emphasise here is the structural adjustments that the 
economy was able to make thereby off-setting, to a certain extent, the 
loss of revenue which resulted from the curtailment of activities in the 
Canal Zone. In part these adjustments were made possible by developments 
which occurred during the war years. 
5. War-time shortage spurred local enterprise into the quest for and use 
of a variety of industrial and agricultural opportunities that were never 
considered feasible before. Apart from an improvement of the country's 
road and cooanunications network, this endeavour took the form of sub-
stantial increases in agricultural and industrial output. Between 1941 
and 1946 the sown area for the three major crops (i.e. rice, maize and 
beans) was Increased by more than 50 per cent; cattle and pig slaughtering 
by 70 and 19 per cent respectively; output of sugar rose by 82 per cent 
and condensed milk by 80 per cent; and the consumption of gas and electricity 
increased by 73 and 62 per cent respectively. 
6. These developments during the war years paved the way for the structural 




Panama's comparatively advantageous price structure after the war, imports 
. substitution proceeded especially rapidly between 1950 and 1955 and con-
tinued at a slower pace thereafter* Thus, eleven categories of imports of 
consumer goods including food stuffs, drinks,textiles, leather goods, and 
paper products, which accounted for some 45*2 per cent of total imports 
in 1950, dropped to about 35 per cent in 1955 and again to 32 per cent in 
1963» Similarly, the export sector showed encouraging dynamism* The trend 
was reflected both in the range and. quantity of exports.of goods. To the 
traditional list of exports were now added cattle, meat, wood, paper products, 
and refined oil and oil derivatives, so that from 22»1 million balboas in 
1950, exports rose to 54*7 million balboas In 1963 (at constant prices of 
1960) - an increase of some 150 per cent* -
7-* It is a significant fact that this, dynamism has not been confined to 
the foreign trade sector* Indeed, the encouraging trade picture, presented 
here reflects a general.record of growth which caused gross.domestic 
product (GDP) to shoot up from 276,7 million balboas in 1950 to 533.1 million 
balboas in 1963 (in constant prices of I960)« In terms of sustained annual 
growth this represented an average of 4*2 per cent for the period 1950-60; 
7*5 per cent during the five years 1960-1964 and 8.1 per cent in 1964-65» 
8. It Is noteworthy that among the six major sectors(i.e. agriculture, 
manufacturing Industry, retail and wholesale trade, housing and miscellaneous 
services including those performed for the Canal Zone) which between them 
had accounted for some 87 per cent of GDP in 1950, manufacturing industry 
took the lead: from a total of 23*5 million balboas (or 8*4 per cent of . 
GDP) in 1950 its contribution rose to 9l«5 million balboas (or 16*4 per 
cent of GDP) in 1964* Distributive trade came a moderate second from 
34.9 million balboas (or 12.6 per cent of GDP) in 1950, its share rose to 
82.6 million balboas (or 14.5 per cent of GDP) in 1964. The contribution 
• made by all the other major sectors to the GDP had, however, declined 
proportionately by 1964* This is particularly true of agriculture which, 
while it had contributed to the country's trade balance, was nevertheless 
disappointing. This is illustrated by the decline of the agricultural share 
in the GDP from 26*9 per cent in 1950 to just over 20 per cent in 1964». The 
explanation lies', of course, in the disparate character. of Panamanian 
/agriculture; 
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agriculture; the most progressive part of this, which consists of foreign-
owned and operated plantations, remains small, while the bulk of the 
product is still produced under very primitive conditions by a peasant 
population who account for 55 per cent of the country's total population. 
On. the other hand, the minor sectors of the economy (i.e. building and 
construction, transport, utilities, banks and finance and public administration) 
which between them contributed slightly more than 13 per cent in 1950, have 
continued their growth at an annual rate of 7.8 per cent, so that by 1964 
they were able to account.for 19 per cent of the GDP. 
9* Besides the success achieved by manufacturing industry, there are two 
other encouraging trends which should be noted« first, there is the continued 
decline in the importance of the Canal Zone as a component of the gross 
domestic product* Indeed, the one-time preponderant role of the Canal Zone 
has no diminished that its net contribution in goods, services and annuity 
accounted for no more than 12 per cent of the gross national product (GNP)r 
in 1959» Since then, however, it has risen again but never to anything 
like its war-time dimensions. As matters stand, the canal's annual 
contribution has averaged during 1960-64 some 14 - 15.5 per cent of the GNP. 
Secondly, gross domestic formation and national savings have registered 
appreciable growth records. Gross investment in the private sector rose 
from 47.6 million balboas in 1959 to 86.9 million in 1965, and the corre-
sponding figures for the public sector were 16*6 and 22«© million balboas 
respectively. Within both sectors gross capital formation represented some 
18 of the GDP in 1965» Similarly, national savings more than doubled in 
the period 1959-65 rising from 42.8 to 94.6 million balboas« 
10, Several factors have combined to stimulate and foster growth. Besides 
such obvious ones as the country's geographical location and its agricultural 
resources and skilled labour, there has been a definite government policy 
consciously designed to encourage and reinforce the process of growth. This 
policy is embodied in a wide range of measures introduced or accepted by 
successive political groups who have acceded to power in the past two decades. 
These included the retention of the special ties with the U.S. dollar; the 
free movement of funds into and out of the country; a liberal trade policy 
tempered by a measure of protective tariff for the benefit of infant indus-




preferential tax jpolicy especially intended to attract the foreign investor; 
and, above all, an indomitable faith in, and respect for, the principles of 
private "ownership and enterprise* 
11* The significance of these successes should not, however, be exager» 
ated. They were accompanied by sizeable unemployment (especially in the 
urban centres) which account for 11 per cent of the,country's labour force 
and by chronic weakness in the balance of payments: available figures of 
the last six years show that trade deficit has nearly doubled, rising from 
55 million balboas in 1959 to 96 million in 1965* Moreover, despite the 
declining importance of the canal as an economic factor and the modest start 
that has been made to broaden and diversify the country's economic base, the 
; record of the past two decades or so unmistakeably shows that national 
solvency still remains largely a function of extraneous forces over which 
Panama has very little control. For the ever-widening gap has been met by 
foreign exchange receipts from four main sources: (1) the sale of goods and 
services to the canal (which though relatively declining has contributed 
a yearly average of some 92 million balboas between 1962 and 1964); (ii) con-
tinual, external borrowing (which by the end of 1964 exceeded 112 million 
dollars and is still rising); (ill) an inflow of private capital, estimated 
at some 20 million dollars a year; and (iv) a deterioration in the foreign 
assets of. the banking system. 
12* The weakness inherent in this situation is ail too obvious; dependence 
on .external finance has become a way of life in Panama, but the availability 
of outside funds to finance current consumption cannot be expected to 
continue indefinitely even at their present rate, much less at a rate com-
mensurate with continual growth and rising living standards* 
13* If this evaluation of Panama's performance sounds soihewhat harsh, it 
is nevertheless suggested by a closer look at the record* Takei'for instance, 
the phenomenal population growth which the country has lately been experi-
encing atthe rate of 3.2 per cent a year. This has not only increased the 
supply of labour and, therefore, unemployment (which official statistics 
show as having increased from 8*8 per cent in 1950 to 11*2 in 1960 of.the 
so-called "economically active" population). It has also raised the ratio 




Reliable estimates put this latter rate in the order of 9 - 10 dependents 
per person within the working age group. Seen in this light unemployment 
is evidently a greater problem than official statistics imply and is causing 
greater hardship to a much larger and ever-increasing section of the 
population, not to mention the underemployed and the seasonally employed 
and their dependents. That this state of affairs should exist in a 
phase of prosperity is a curious paradox. It can only mean that this 
prosperity is either over-rated or is confined to certain groups. Possibly 
both explanations are partly true. 
14. Or, consider the case of the balance of payments. Here the most 
encouraging item has been the receipts from exports of goods. They have 
gone up from 36 million dollars in 1959 to 67 million in 1964. Against 
this, however, must be placed a corresponding increase in imports so that 
the ratio between the two items has remained unaltered. Even then, this 
relative success in maintaining the same proportion between imports and 
exports was possible only because of the exports of refined oil products 
and other minor items. 
Otherwise, Panama's staple exports have been gradually loosing ground, 
so much so that by 1964 they represented no more than 30 per cent of the 
value of total imports (excluding imports of crude oil). 
15« Put in quantitative terms, unlike imports, staple exports have lagged 
considerably behind the GNPt while the GNP has increased at the rate of 
7.2 per cent in the past five years and imports at the rate of 11.8 per 
cent in the same period, staple exports have Increased only at the modest 
rate of 5.8 per cent. Nor should this disappointing performance be 
surprising, so long as the country continues to rely on a few major but 
capricious agricultural commodities for her staple exports. 
16. Nor does the data on capital formation give much ground for optimism. 
According to official statistics, gross domestic capital formation in the 
most prosperous period that Panama has experienced, that is the years 
1959-65, has risen from 55 million balboas (or 16 per the GDP) to 109 million 




88 million balboas or about ,17 per cent of the domestic product. Against 
this favourable record, however, it should be remembered that in the 
same period Panama's deficit on current account"has averaged some 
16.5 million dollars a year, that, capital transfers, both private and 
public, have averaged about 26,5 .million dollars a year, and,that changes 
in net foreign assets of the banks have added an average of some 3»8 million 
dollars a year. In other words, not less than one equivalent of 45 per cent 
of annual average domestic investment has come from abroad. Further, while 
investment in the public sector has more than doubled between i960 and 1964 
and has been devoted to projects of top priority (e.g. transport, electricity, 
water supply, low-cost housing, health and education), private,invest-
ment, which accounted for nearly two-thirds of the total, has lagged con-
siderably behind. It rose from 58.6 million balboas in 1956 to 76.8 million 
in 1964 (in i960 prices). Worse still, a substantial part ôf this was con-
centrated in residential devcloisnént which, ironically enough, was given 
an added stimulus by means of a five-year tax exemption. .. Thus, while in 
aggregate figures gross- domestic capital formation may present a fairly 
encouraging picture, the fact* is that almost half of it has come frdm abroad 
and a substantial part of the other half was in the form of investments in 
real estate. r 
17. This brief survey enables us to summarize some essential features of 
the Panamanian economy» On more than one occasion the economy has. shown 
that it possessed fairly adequate rësources and the dynamism to make the 
necessary structural adjustments when challenged by circumstances. But 
the economic performance In the face of changing circumstances, though 
satisfactory on the whole, has not been a story of unmitigated success. 
National solvency was maintained despite the post-war decline in the economic 
role of the canal; satisfactory progress was also made by nativë industry 
In producing essential consumer goods for the home market; exports of goods 
were expanded and diversified but only maintained their relative position 
against continually rising imports. Among the circumstances which havë 
made this success possible are a favourable geographical location, the 
possession of a fairly adequately trained labour force, the availability 
/of some 
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of some unexplotted natural resources and the application of a government 
policy which can best be described as a mixture of protectionism and 
laissez-faire» However, the main weakness which offsets this record is 
that self-sufficiency still remains more distant than ever before» Despite 
the decline in the relative importance of the canal, the economy is hope-
lessly dependent on external economic forces over which is has little or 
no control* 
II 
18» So much then for past developments and the forces that determined 
their course. Now, at a stage of her struggle for economic survival when 
her needs for outside resources are perhaps greatest, Panama has come to 
learn that the canal cannot be relied upon for much longer as a source 
of revenue, even to see her through this transitional phase. While she 
was laying plans to place her economy on its feet, she suddenly discovered 
that she had been out-stripped by events» Costly to run and maintain and 
quite unsuited for the passage of the new ocean-going giant tankers, the 
canal may have to be replaced by a sea-level substitute* Naturally enough 
those concerned with current financial pressures are dismayed by the 
discovery. For the sudden loss of 18 per cent of GDP in the face of 
mounting unemployment and ever increasing reliance on foreign funds is 
a grave matter indeed» Yet one wonders if the consternation and panic 
atmosphere are really justified, and if this new development is not a 
blessing in disguise. After all Panama has long reckoned on the possibility 
that the canal would eventually cease to be an important factor in her 
economy, so that the urgency of the present debate arises more from the 
timing of the proposal than from its novelty. All the same, Panamanians 
are faced with two pressing and immediate problems: (i) the immediate 
dislocation which the projected abandonment of the canal would entail, 
and (ii) the extent to which this scheme can be turned to account in the 




19% Several studies are being prepared to assess the short and long-term 
effects of the proposed canal; on different sectors of the economy; the 
present one is an attempt to asses its impact upon the industrial sector* 
20» Essentially there are three main lines of investigation which need 
to be pursued. The first concerns the supply of, and demand for, labour 
directly required for work on the new canal at various stages of its 
construction. Specifically, what should be investigated here is the types 
of skill and number of skilled workers needed for various phases of the 
project, and whether or not.(and if not, then how) they can be made available 
locally. 
21« The second relates to the demand for goods and services during the 
various phases of construction and the employment opportunities this demand 
will generate. This means that an attempt should be made to project the 
demand for construction materials, and their availability locally; for 
foods and other consumer goods and their availability locally too; for 
dwelling houses...etc.; and for miscellaneous other services, e.g. transport 
and coioaunications and professional services. Both these approaches bear 
upon the immediate, and medium-term repercussions of the project« 
22. The third inquiry should be concerned with the situation after the 
canal is completed* Surplus labour released as a result of the closure of 
the present canal as well as that released after the completion of the new 
one, will coincide to aggravate the unemployment situation. It is no con-
solation that the full Impact may be spread out over a period of time as 
the redundant labour is gradually released. So long as aggregate demand 
will continue.to fall, widespread unemployment will ultimately result, 
unless of course, new forces are gradually brought into play to absorb the 
unemployed« 
23. The approach to these problems will need to be more than merely 
quantitative. The Government will be called on to Introduce a wide range 
of regulatory and corrective measures and much of this will entail adminis-
trative reorganisation. It will, therefore, be necessary to give careful 
consideration to the aspects of public policy involved if the government 





24, However, an analysis along the lines suggested would be both 
impracticable and premature at:this stage. It would require the labour 
of more than one person over a period of.time much longer than that allowed 
the present writer; an attempt to trace the ramifications of such a wide 
range of functionally related variables and to assess their repercussions 
should form the major part of a long-term government plan. So far, however, 
planning has been concerned with short- or medium-term targets and has not 
touched on or even recognised the problems posed by the canal. What is 
required is the formulation of a long-range plan (which will be subject to 
periodic evaluation and revision) including the proposed canal as an 
integral and major part of it* Whether the cost of construction and actual 
execution of the project would be the responsibility,wholly or partially 
of another party has no bearing on the point under discussion. What the 
planners will need to ascertain is all such engineering and technical data 
as will have direct bearing on the long-term comprehensive model which it 
will be their task to construct. In particular their data must include 
the physical location of the canal; the technique of construction (i.e. 
whether conventional or nuclear engineering methods will be used); the 
duration of the construction process and how It is proposed to phase it; 
the labour and building material requirements within each phase as well 
as estimates of expenditure on both items within Panama* It will be some 
time, no doubt,, before this type of information can be ascertained; but 
this need not cause discouragement; a great many preparatory measures can 
and should be undertaken by the government before the stage is reached 
when this information becomes available and useable* 
25. These preparatory measures are in fact a prerequisite to the success 
of the long-range planning. For this reason and while the various technical 




should suspend their attempt to construct a quantitative model which can 
only be highly conjectural at this stage in favour of a thorough review 
of the framework of government economic policy to see how compatible • 
this is with the country's broad development objectives and to suggest 
the structural and legislative alterations that will make future plans 
more realistic and their objective more attainable. 
26. What we shall endeavour to sketch out in the following part of this 
study, then, Is a broad guide to policy. We shall indicate the structural 
adjustments which will be needed to stimulate and complement full and 
efficient use of productive factors and to facilitate the flow of 
production. Our discussion will, of necessity, be confined to manufacturing 
Industry, although obviously this by Itself can hardly provide the answer 
to Panama's quest for economic independence. However, agriculture and 
services will be dealt with by other members of the team and as such lie 





27, It needs little perception and only a slight acquaintancie with 
recent events and the international financial scene to see that one of 
the main obstacles that will face the planners of Panama's industrial» 
isation will arise from shortage of capital. This may sound surprising 
at present since the country has somehow always managed to finance her 
capital and current requirements. However, rising trends of interest rates in 
recent years have presented difficulties not only to developing countries 
but even in some of the most reputable and attractive international 
capital markets. With an ever-growing and intensified quest for develop-
ment and industrialisation throughout the world, it is a safe assumption 
that the trend will continue and be re-inforced in the years to come. 
This is just about the period when Panama's development plans will be in 
full swing and her capital requirements will have approached their 
maximum. 
28. The point can hardly be over-eraphasi*ed. To appreciate the magnitude 
of the problem involved let us (admittedly at the risk of great over-
simplification) give it a quantitative expression. For the moment, let us 
disregard the canal and assume that we are only concerned with maintaining 
the growth rate which has averaged during the five-year period 1960-64 
some 7S5 a year. This is, in fact, not quite as ambitious as it may sound: 
after allowing for a population growth of some 3.2 a year it comes to 
about 4.3 which would double per capita income once every 17 years. Now, 
let us take as our point of departure the GNP for 1964 which stood &t 
590 million balboas (at current prices). At a compound growth rate of 
7.5 this should by the end of 1974, reach 1,306.8 million balboas, an 
increase of 716.8 tt£li£en balboas over the base year, or a mean annual 
Increase of 71.6 million balboas. If we assume a capital co-efficient of 
3 (hardly unrealistic in view of the long gestation period which generally 
precedes the take-off stage and a large investment in social overhead 
that would pay dividend only in the long run) average annual investment 




the desired target rate. This means an-investment ratio of about 0.22 which 
obviously could1 hardly be met out of domestic savings alone even if the 
country were to curb its consumption very drastically which on present 
showing seems'unlikely. 
29. Worse still; capital scarcity in Panama will be aggravated by two 
factors; a conspicuous disparity in income and wealth distribution and 
peculiar rigidity in the internal interest rate structure. Both factors 
are already adversely affecting the process of capital accumulation and 
will continue to do so in the future unless urgent and serious efforts 
are made to remedy the situation. 
30. With regard to the concentration of income and wealth in the hands 
of the few, it is unnecessary to dwell here on the social and political 
instability it is breeding. These are obvious enough. The point here is 
that his concentration of economic power is operating in practice to the 
detriment of industrial growth. This:is because investment decision 
within the private sector is at present concentrated in the hands.of 
traders and landlords whose traditional interest lies outside, or even 
runs counter to, manufacturing industry. These- groups have always 
favoured transactions with quick turn-over and high return* This is why 
the greater part of capital accumulation-in Panama has taken the form of 
investment in luxury residential buildings, speculative land-ownership 
and the building up of inventories and expansion of import trade. The 
pattern is all.vtoo familiar and has received adequate treatment in various 
reports which are already available to the government, such as Professor 
Taylor's excellent Fiscal Survey. 
31. However, even if corrective measures were immediately introduced 
to mitigate this inequality they could hardly be expected to produce the 
desired effect in the near future. Redistributional fiscal measures are 
essentially long-term instruments; so that along with them some positive 
legislative action will be necessary if investors areiio la induced to 
take the risk inherent in new industrial undertakings. We shall have 




32* The problem of interest rate is equally involved. It is part of 
the thornier question of Panama's monetary system which raises a host of 
political issues that are best avoided because, if for no other reason, 
they fall outside the present terms of reference. 
33. At the time of writing and for some time past official policy has 
fixed interest rate at a maximum of 7 per cent. As we said before, this 
made the Panamanian market attractive while interest rates were low 
abroad. When these started to rise the picture was complicated, Short 
term financing was hardly affected, presumably because of the adequacy 
of the resources of the commercial banking system. In long* and medium-
term finance, however, new trends began to show. Competent entrepreneur-
ship was able to attract capital In three main fields; luxury buildings, 
speculative land purchases and consumer credit. Over the past two decades 
these proved the most rewarding fields of investment and have consequently 
succeeded in absorbing the lion's share of foreign and domestic capital. 
It is highly doubtful whether the raising of interest rate by one or two 
points will alter the situation and divert capital to manufacturing 
industry. In fact,it is quite likely that this measure may produce the 
opposite effect, so that the three established markets will remain unaf-
fected, or may even benefit by the rise, while the cost of borrowing to 
industry will be increased. 
34. In the present writer's opinion, therefore, the question of interest 
rate should be tackled on a different level altogether. It should be 
settled once and for all by reorganizing the banking system along the 
lines suggested by the proposal gently put by the International Monetary 
Fund consultation team of 1964. The Bank can then exercise its influence 
not only through its re-discount policy which can be manipulated to meet 
the requirements of the market; with adequate discretionary powers its 
range of rediscount operations may be extended to include industrial 
papers. This device will have to be employed deftly and carefully, but 
that is a question of management and is no different from other central 




35. Besides, a redistributive fiscal policy and a flexible interest 
rate managed by the Central Bank, there are several tax measures which 
the government may wish to consider with a view to encouraging investment 
in manufacturing industry. In the first place, the government may feel 
inclined to review and repeal the preferential tax treatment at present 
allowed to investors in real estate. To an outside observer it is odd 
that in the present circumstances of keen competition for capital among 
the various sectors, real estate transactions should enjoy advantages 
denied to other sectors. At present, income from real estate developments 
is allowed tax free for the first five years as against the ineffective 
and dubious exemption from import duties on capital equipment and raw 
materials and on income from exports which industrial Enterprises theoret-
ically enjoy. As we shall see presently, with the singular exception of 
the oil refinery, industry rarely avails itself of either. Unless there 
are some compelling reasons to maintain this arrangement it would seem 
more logical, therefore, to reverse the situation so that more effective 
and generous tax benefits be granted to manufacturing enterprise and that 
real estate investment be denied any such benefits if a better allocation 
of capital resources is to be achieved between these two sectors. 
36. It is also necessary to put a limit to speculative land purchases 
(e.g. through the application of some form of capital gains tax) and to 
ration funds now channelled to consumer credit organisations. The present 
free-for-all competition for capital funds cannot continue unchecked if 
industry is to have its fair share of the limited capital in the country. 
,37. Another piece of legislation which calls for urgent review and 
revision is the Development of Production Act (No. 25 of 1957). The act 
is defective in three respects: its cumbersome and time-e©®8tsaiag: procedure, 
its crude and nebulous criteria of evaluation, and Its scanty but grossly 
over-rated benefits. Evaluation of projects for which tax exemption or 
protection is claimed is undertaken by the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Commerce and Industry, and by the National Economic Council and is finally 
approved by no less a body than the Cabinet. Applications are examined as 




and: adequately trained staff to undertake this task. Consequently, the 
process may, according to report, take any time from three to fifteen 
months. Moreover, considering that the mass of information required by 
the Act a^d the conditions with which a grant of exemption is hedged, it 
is hardly surprising that there have been so many complaints that the 
legislation will not work. For even if objectively enforced (and there is 
no reason to believe that it is not) the process of evaluation is inevit-
ably crude with an element of arbitrariness about it and leaves no room 
for the application of such refined evaluation techniques as the account-
ing prices procedure. 
38. There are other extraordinary and anomalous features in the Act. 
Thus, in considering an application for tax exemption, the &aw places on 
the applicant the onus of proving, among other things, (i) the "adequacy 
of the machinery, instruments and tools for the manufacture of the product 
dad its productive capacity to the current and future internal demand", 
(ii) "the importance of the research apparatus which the proposed enter-
prise may establish", (iii) and its beneficial "contribution to the 
national Income and distribution of same among the factors of production..." 
39. Then, if and when exemption is finally granted in principle, the 
entrepreneur is required to apply for exemption from duty every time a 
new consignment of imported goods arrives in the country. The detailed 
Report of Continental-Allied Co. Inc. lists no less than ten distinct 
administrative steps, involving at least six separate departments and 
entailing considerable loss of time that a privileged applicant must 
undertake before he obtains exemption on a new consignment of imported 
goods. 
40. But perhaps one of the most curious features of the Law under review 
is the provisions under paragraph (b) of Article 6 and paragraph (f) of 
Article 7. The first of these prohibits the use of imported raw materials 
by enterprises granted tax exemption except when these materials are locally 
unobtainable in sufficient quantity; and in any case no importation can be 
authorised without prior consultation with the domestic producers of these 
materials. The second requires enterprises to buy domestic raw materials 
/"at a price 
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"at a price not less than the minimum fixed by the official agencies and 
in quantities which will not exceed the requirements of the enterprise as 
determined by the Ministry". This is not the kind of control of industry 
that is desirable in a country professing adherance to the principles of 
free enterprise and one that is short of capital, entrepreneurial talent 
and possesses no great unusual natural resourced of her own. Indeed, the 
cost in terms of lost time, inconvenience and expense sustained by enter-
prises is such that many industrialists are said to decline the advantages 
of exemption from duty in order to retain their freedom of action. Clearly 
the weakness in the Act lies in its attempt to reconcile two basically 
conflicting interests: those of raw material producers and those of the 
industrialists when, in practice, it has proved beneficial to neither. 
It has hardly benefitted the former as industrialists have been able to 
by-pass its provisions whenever necessary by paying the duty and import-
ing the materials they preferred; and while it pretended to help 
industrialists through exemptions from duty, it has imposed on them 
such limitations (through the use of specially priced home products) 
as to have outweighed the benefits of exemption. As a result,the only 
effect this law seems to have is to penalise the domestic consumer and 
render Panamanian manufactures less competitive abroad. The Act needs 
to be completely revised without delay. A considerable fund of experience 
in this field now exists in many of the smaller developing countries and 
Panama would be well-advised to acquaint herself (through the appropriate 
channels of the I® Secretariat ) with some of the most recent legislation 
on this problem. In these countries special attention has been given to 
three vital points: (1) the competitiveness of their home industrial 
products abroad, (2) the protection of such infant industries as* may be 
thought to be potentially capable of making good, and (3) the protection 
of the domestic market against monopolistic practices. 
41. However, even a careful revision or repeal of this law would not in 
itself suffice to attract foreign enterprise and capital to Panama. More 
positive concessions will be needed. Exemption from income tax (both 




free land sites, the reduction in the rates charged for public utilities 
(especially gas, electricity and water), the granting of warehousing and 
storage facilities are just a few of the many inducements that have been 
employed by various African and Asian states in the endeavour to attract 
capital and enterprise to their countries. It is difficult to see how 
Panama can compete successfully in this field without adopting the same 
devices. A comparison with recent legislation in some of these countries 
will reveal that Panama's attitude towards capital and enterprise has 
been too conservative. This may well account for the lack of interest 
especially among European manufacturers and entrepreneurs in exploring 
the country's potential despite its unique location. For what these men 
look for in their quest for new opportunities is some distinct advantages 
that will make it worth their while to set up new industrial bases over-
seas in the face of obvious risks arising from limited local markets, 
low personal income and laborious administrative practices. Clearly, in 
the eyes of many manufacturing enterprises Panama's tax concessions are 
not attractive enough to outweigh these risks. 
42. Ttlese fiscal measures by themselves, no matter how liberally framed, 
will not be enough to alter the present pattern of industrial growth* 
They may well supplement, but can never supplant, equally essential 
measures in related fields. 
43. One such obvious measure is that of improving the mechanism of 
Panama's industrial finance. There already exists in Panama an industrial 
bank to meet long- and medium-term credit requirements of industry* It 
was organised, with government encouragement, by some of the banks now 
operating in the country togsther with eminent businessmen and 
industrialists. It was granted a U.S. loan of 4 million dollars for a 
period of twenty years at 2.5 per cent interest. The loan was intended 
to tide the bank over its initial stage in the hope that as this went on, 
it would build up its own resources until it eould eventually stand on 
its own feet. What actually happened, however, was that the inflexibility 




limited its ability to attract deposits. So for the time being at any 
rate the bank's capital and the U.S. Government loan remain its main 
sources of funds. Understandably the scope of the bank's operations 
was greatly restricted. Oddly enough, any hope that thiŝ  problem 
might have been overcome by a judicious and selective equity participa-
tion or through the exercise of stock options in projects it might help 
to finance, has been ruled out by an extraordinary provision in the bank's 
charter which prohibited this otherwise conroon practice. Thus, despite 
an able management and numerous opportunities in the country where it 
could have made valuable contributions, the bank is being frustrated by 
a combination of rules that are not conducive to the purpose to which it 
was intended to serve. 
44. It is recommended that these restrictions on the bank's operations 
be removed and that its charter be thowmiWy eesrised« The bank's range 
of industrial finance should be widened to include not only equity 
participation, the acquisition of stock through the exercise of options, 
mortgages and guaranties ..... etc., but also in view of the absence in 
the country of a proper capital market, the bank should be allowed to 
undertake such operations as underwriting, private and public bond 
floating, and hire-purchase finance. 
45. Another measure which recommends itself as an essential and 
integral part of a public policy favourable to industrial growth and 
one closely related to the proposed reform of the industrial bank is 
direct public participation in the financing of some basic industrial 
enterprises. The recommendation is not as incompatible with the principles 
of private enterprise as it may sound. The practice is widely accepted 
in many states where private enterprise is held as a tenet of their 
political philosophy. It is also one of the practices often advocated 
by the World Bank and its subsidiary, the I.F.C., as well as the U.S. 
Government bilateral financial agencies. Its purpose 16 to provide the 
and initiative Heeded far the es;fcsfeli¿boreftt of new industries 
arid to «imiattisre the financial risks involved* It be iau&d fai" more 
effective than what has so far been attempted in persuading private investors 




from investment in infrastructure) the only direct contribution the public 
sector has made in this respect has consisted of setting up a semi-public 
agency, (INPADE), whose work has consisted of providing advisory services 
and feasibility and work studies for private industry, 
46, Although in theory, privately supported, in fact INPADE has existed 
only on the financial contribution of the government and the technical sup-
port it has been receiving from the U,S, aid programme. The fact that, in 
spite of several years of experiment with various ideas, this agency has not 
yet been able to get any of its sponsored projects accepted by private 
industry calls for a critical evaluation of the basic concepts on which it 
was founded, Host of those involved in this experiment agree that it has 
failed because the risk which these projects involved would have fallen 
solely on the private investors. Understandably, the private investor was 
not impressed by Industrial schemes advocated by a group of officials who 
took no share of the risk or financial responsibility, 
47, It is perhaps worth emphasising that the idea of public sharing in the 
risk capital of some basic industries does not imply government ownership of 
industrial enterprises, Rather the contrary. What is proposed here is that 
public funds be used as a device to convince the private investor (and 
especially foreign concerns) of the soundness of the new project. Once the 
initial stage of raising the necessary capital and selecting the right 
management is over and the new enterprise has demonstrated its ability to 
stand on its feet, the government may well choose to turn over its equity 
or loan interest to the private sector and thus use its limited resources as 
a lever for the creation of several basic industries. Experience in other 
countries shows that this method can be an effective instrument in gaining 
the confidence not only of domestic investors but of foreign enterprises as well. 
48, To put this recommendation into effect the following measures or 
re-organisation would be necessary: 
(1) INPADE should be integrated in the Development Bank as its 
Planning and Research Unit. 
(2) Further, it should be reorganised and more adequately staffed 
so as to make it capable of carrying out basic research and feasibility 




(3) The Bank should be subsidised by the government (and possibly by 
the Chamber of Industry and Commerce or some such body) as well as by the 
U.S. Technical Aid Programme for at least part of the annual cost of staff 
and research work. 
(4) The Bank's research programme should be drawn up as a result of 
a coordinated effort between (a) The Planning Commission, (b) the private 
sector (e.g. the Chamber of Industry and Commerce), and (c) the U.S. United 
Nations aid authorities, and approved by the Board of Management of the Bank. 
(5) The Planning Commission should include in the capital budget 
adequate sums to ensure government equity and/or loanparticipation in 
certain industries which will have been covered by INPADE's research pro-
gramme, proved feasible and approved both by the Bank and the Planning Com-
mission. Government participation should not fall below, say, 10 per cent 
and not exceed 49 per cent of the equity needed and if desired, should not 
be held permanently by the Treasury. The inclusion in the capital budget 
of sums earmarked for industry is an essential step without which the rest 
of the measures recommended here will lose much of their force. 
(6) It is essential that coordination be maintained between the 
Planning Commission, representatives of the private sector, representatives 
of the aid donating agencies, and the Bank's Planning and Research Unit. 
A committee consisting or representatives of each with the President of 
the Bank as Chairman should meet at least three or four times a year. Its 
main tasks should be: (a) to select a programme of project investigation 
and assign priority to projects within the programme; (b) to suggest an 
order of magnitude of government commitments which will serve as a basis 
for inclusion in the capital budget; (c) to follow up the progress of the 
investigation schedule and revise It when necessary; and (d) to act as an 
advisory body both to the Planning Commission and the Ministry of Commerce, 






49. Our discussion of the broad policy necessary to stimulate industrial 
capital accumulation will not be complete without a brief allusion to one 
important question invariably present throughout the current debate on the 
canal. This concerns the,capital equipment now available in the Canal Zone 
which may well be turned over to the Panamanian authorities as part of the 
settlement between Panama and United States. The list of capital equipment 
now available is fairly extensive. It includes an up-to-date computer 
unit; an electricity generating plant; central air conditioning plant; 
refrigerated trucks, and a refrigeration plant of the Atlantic coast; a 
one-thousand ton dry dock with complete facilities as well as two smaller 
dry docks; a complete iron foundry; a fully equipped maintenance workshop 
capable of servicing a wide range of industries; a machine tool shop, a 
printing press; an oil tank farm and pipe line. The transfer of these 
assets to the Panamanian authorities should provide an excellent starting 
point for an industrialisation programme. The fact that ail this diversified 
equipment happens to be conveniently located in one place is an unsurpassed 
opportunity for setting up a substantial industrial estate,the like of 
which cannot be found anywhere in Central America. 
50. Following the transfer of the assets to the Panamanian government 
the estate can be established (preferably within the zone, but outside it 
if necessary) through the setting up of a corporation whose assets will 
consist principally of the equipment in question. Its stock may be sold 
to the general public, the banks and the Industrial (Development) Bank. 
The government may retain a share in the equity -say about 20-25 per cent« 
The inclusion of the Bank among the principal shareholders is strongly 
recommended. It will make for closer coordination between it and the 
industrialists whose plants and workshops will form part of the complex 
and thus ensure the prompt and smooth provision of financial and technical aid. 
51. The corporation should aim at the gradual disposal or sub-contracting 
of its equipment to the private sector retaining to Itself only that part 




power generation, and communication transport, storage, air-conditioning, 
water distillation.., etc. After the estate has been surveyed, a proper 
plan should be prepared so that land either within the present "zone" or 
adjacent to it may be improved, landscaped and divided into lots which 
should be offered (for outright sale or lease) either as improved sites 
or general-purpose workshops. Certain parts of the estate may also be 
reservéd for custom-built factories. 
52. Certain qualifing conditions may be laid down for the admission of 
enterprises to the estate. Priority should be given to applicants whose 
manufacturing activity can benefit by its location within the estate,, 
Apart from those already established in the "zone" (e.g. the dry docks, 
machine tools) metal conversion industries should have prior claim on 
sites in the estate. 
53» With regard to the dry docks, a survey should be carried out to 
determine the following factsi 
(a) The availability of similar facilities in the region and the 
repair work that will be potentially available to Panama. 
(b) Thé utility of equipment, its condition and cost of repair, 
replacement and expansion if necessary* 
(c) The location of the main dock and whether or not the smaller ones 
should be incorporated in it» 
(d) The feasibility of building small craft, barges etc. and their 
market potentials. 
V 
54» So much for capital* Let us now turn to another productive factor, 
labour* Two main characteristics are generally held to distinguish 
Panamanian labour; its high rate of growth and its reportedly high 
technical standards as compared with other Central American states* Yet 
doubt has been expressed on both points* With regard to the growth rate 
U. N. estimates indicate that the so-called "economically active" popula-
tion which stood at about 346 000 in 1964 will have increased to nearly 
/ 644 000 
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644 000 by 1980, On the other hand a survey carried out a few years ago 
by an expert from the World Bank asserted that "in the long run, if 
development proceeds as it should, Panama faces a scarcity of labour 
especially in agriculture". The latter statement sound incredible, for 
normal experience suggests that as agricultural productivity improves, 
under-employment, a prevalent feature at present, will increase and labour 
suspluses will eventually spill over into the urban markets. However, 
the problem cannot be dismissed so lightly on general theoretical grounds. 
It must be assumed that the expert in question has some grounds for 
making the statements A careful examination of this point is therefore 
necessary to ascertain its validity. The agricultural expert and the 
human resources specialist in the United Nations' team should be aware of 
the IBRD's warning and should be asked to give an opinion on it* As far 
as government action is concerned there is little that can be recommended 
at this point. Any detailed planning of the number of jobs that will 
have to be created will, of necessity, have to await the factual data and 
technical information that have been alluded to above, 
55, Opinion is equally divided about the quality of Panamanian labour* 
While Messrs Tanenbaum and Associates, who have undertaken a detailed 
comparative study of labour productivity in Panama and neighbouring 
countries, are quite optimistic about the present state of affairs, the 
IBRD survey quoted above gives a different impressions "There is a general 
shortage of skilled mechanics and operators. Generally speaking,Panamanians 
are reluctant to become mechanics and prefer office jobs. Some industries 
have found it necessary to hire persons of other nationalities for jobs 
requiring a high degree of mechanical skill", 
56, But even if the favourable assessment of Messrs Tanenbaum and 
Associates were to prove correct, the present situation leaves much to be 
desired. For what should be borne in mind is that so far the country 
has discovered no outstanding mineral or other natural resources. Her 
labour force will, therefore, continue to be her most valuable asset. 
Further, as a small country whith no exceptional resources, Panama will 
have to depend on a diversified list of exports destined for marketing 




exports will have to have one or two obvious attrations: they will have 
to be either competitive in price, or of an exceptionally high quality, 
Host feasibility studies carried out under INPADE's auspices seem to 
indicate than Panamanian products cannot successfully compete with mass-
produced commodities abroad and that this has been a reason for disap-
pointment and frustration« If Panama's resources, as they are at present 
known,dc not enable her to offer her manufactures on favourable terms 
in competition with large-scale producers, then she will have to change 
her industrial orientation and concentrate on quality products intended 
for customers within high income brackets in richer markets. Switzerland's 
experience may be cited here as a classic example of what niay be 
accomplished with meagre natural resources but a highly trained and well 
disciplined labour force* A considerable amount of Swiss products 
consists of consumer goods (e.g. lace, embroidery and textiles, leather 
goods, confectionary and dairy products, drinks and cigarettes, pharma-
ceuticals, paper and paper products)* Between them these constitute 
well over half the country's total exports of which nearly 75 per cent 
goes to markets within Western Europe (EFTA and EEC countries) and the 
United States. Indeed, technical qualifications have in themselves become 
in Switzerland a source of considerable foreign exchange earnings. For 
besides the obvious services such as insurance and banking, some Swiss 
enterprises have found it more practicable to earn their profits by 
passing their technical skill to foreign subsidiaries rather than by the 
expert of manufactures, their role being continued to the training of 
labour and management and the carrying out of basic research. It has been 
reported that in Nestle's industrial complex no more than 3 per cent of 
the labour force is Swiss, the rest is foreign whose training was 
carried out by the parent company in accordance with the provision of 
licensing agreements with foreign enterprises abroad. 
57. To say this, however, is not to imply that the proposed change of 
orientation is easy or can be accomplished in a relatively short time« 
No struggle for survival is easy. But it is essential at the outset to 




of time and effort» Once the objective and its cost are recognised, its 
adoption becomes possible and the task of putting it into effect a 
practical proposition. 
58« Should the foregoing be accepted as a part of the broad strategy for 
development, then the endeavour to raise the standards of technical 
training should receive the same high priority in government planning as 
that of the encouragement of foreign capital. The two must go hand in 
hand. Action in this field does not have to await any elaborate technical 
data or detailed quantitative information. It falls within the broad 
policy framework whose adoption and implementation should proceed as 
rapidly as possible in order to pave the way for the quantitative planning 
that will follow in the next stage, 
59. In the attempt to raise standards of technical training there should 
be no room for compromise. The government should aim at nothing but the 
highest, not by national but by international standards, bearing in mind 
that Panamanian exports will be competing with a vast variety of similar 
products in some of the more sophisticated world markets, 
60» Luckily considerable opportunities exist in bilateral and international 
programmes for assistance with technical training. Special emphasis -
should be placed on vocational training and on advanced training and 
research. Of special significance to the country are such fields as 
engineering (including metal conversion industries), the food industries, 
arts, crafts and design, leather goods, ceramics and pottery. It may be 
found practicable to interest universities and institutions of advanced 
technology in Europe or the United States in establishing field stations 
in Panama where the cost and benefits of training and research may be 
shared by Panama, the institution in question and the donating agency. 
The Science and Engineering Faculties of the University may be used as 
a nucleus for the programme, 
61, Along with this programme for training skilled workers and technicians, 
there should be introduced a parallel programme of management training. 
Highly skilled labour requires highly trained and efficient management 




the other« Arrangements for a joint management programme may also be 
explored with any one of several institutions abroad. The United States 
is ahead of many countries in this field and Business Administration 
Schools like those in Harvard, New York and other centres have a great 
deal to offer in this field, 
62« Panama may also wish to consider making the proposed training 
establishments serve as regional centres for the Central American Repubics, 
In taking a step of this kind, Panama will assert her regional identity, 
underline her interest in common regional problems and make a contribution 
\ 
beneficial alike to her neighbours and her own economy and prestige« 
Needless to say, the success of the experiment will depend on the quality 
and contents of the programmes. Here again there should be no room for 
half measures. Instruction and training should be of the highest 
standard possible, 
VI 
63, The foregoing part of this paper has broadly dealt with two major 
factors of production. The third, the country's natural resources, is 
at present being extensively investigated by another United Nations team« 
At the time when the present writer visited Panama the team was in the 
field, but shortage of time and the dispersal of the team in various 
parts of the country has unfortunately prevented any useful discussion 
of the team's findings« At this point, therefore, the economist has 
nothing to offer; but as soon as these findings are available an economic 
assessment should be attempted. Together with the technical data referred 
to early in this paper, this assessment should provide adequate information 
with which to assess Panama's ability to cope with the demands generated 
by the construction of the new canal, and to suggest the bases for 
quantitative targets, 
64, On the subject of these country's natural resources, a word may be 
in order in connexion with the work that has been done in the past few 
years on the feasibility of certain manufacturing industries. 
/65, It has 
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65. It has been pointed out above that a major weakness of this work 
has been its academic character in the sense that the work was carried 
out without any attention to the availability of the capital that will 
be needed for implementation. However, even on a technical basis the 
work seems far from satisfactory. The decision to allocate funds and 
carry out a feasibility study seems to be made at random. So far as the 
present writer is aware, three reports have been submitted listing a 
number of industries thought to be feasible by the authors. The earliest 
of these is the IBRD study to which reference was made earlier; the second 
is that carried out by Messrs George Fry and Associates under the auspicies 
of the U.S. I.C.A.; and the third is that by Dr. Jack U. Mowll, Because 
of the lack of any definitive information concerning the mineral and 
other natural resources of the country, the recommendations in these 
studies were inevitably broad and general. Thus the first two simply 
listed a number of manufacturing possibilities largely on the basis of 
the import substitution principle. Moreover, in all three studies there 
was either implied or explicit emphasis on two assumptions: (a) Panama's 
geographical location was an important factor in reducing production 
cost, and (b) tariff protection was an indispensable part of government 
industrial policy» 
66. Both assumptions are reasonable enough. What is objectionable is 
that so much emphasis has been placed on them that they now form an 
unquestioned part of the country's industrial policy. The present writer 
is very sceptical about this approach. Tariff protection should be used 
with extreme caution and only as a temporary measure during the initial 
stage of certain industries. As for the location, it is obviously a 
valuable asset; but not such as would reduce costs in the industries 
suggested to the extent of making Panamanian products competitive in 
world markets. Panama's location may reduce costs but it will not make 
her manufactured goods so cheap that other countries will be induced to 
buy from her what they can just as well manufacture at home. 
67. So long as these assumptions persist, it is likely that Panama's 




orientation Is imperative« The main emphasis for the future should be 
placed on raising the quality of Panama's products« 
68® The present writer wishes to associate himself with that part of 
Dr» Mowll's report which recommends that surveys of various natural 
resources should be conducted to list those building materials required 
by the construction of the new canal which may be manufactured locally» 
69. Of the industries proposed in previous studies, clearly the building 
materials industry offers the best opportunities. Provided that the 
surveys disclose an adequate supply of raw materials, the administration 
might be well advised to consider such industries as structural clay 
including pottery and ceramics and related products, oil prints; flat 
and laminated glass; concrete brick and block and other concrete products 
such as central mixed, shrink mixed and/or transit mixed concrete; 
asbestos cement products including siding, shingles, flat corrugated 
sheet, pressure pipe, conduits, ducts... etc. paving mixtures and blocks; 
asphalt felts and coatings; clay and non-clay refractories; nail and wire 
products; woodworking ... etc. 
70. The size of the internal market will, no doubt, be an important 
factor in determining the feasibility of any of these industries since 
they will be primarily meant for domestic consumption. Hence. the urgent 
need for the date repeatedly referred to this paper. As soon as this 
becomes known, detailed feasibility studies should be undertaken preferably 
in conjunction with a group of manufacturers of these materials abroad. 
71« The chemical industry is another field which holds promise for 
Panama. Some branches of this industry can, in fact, be investigated at 
once since the country's agricultural and industrial developments will 
require these products regardless of the canal. Within this group one 
may include mixed fertilizers, materials such as sulphuric, phosphoric 
or nitric acids, superphosphate, ammonia and ammonia compounds... etc. 
Similarly, essential oils, animal glue? albumin, acetic acid and acetone, 
citric acid... etc., have already bean recommended in previous reports 
and should be investigated as early as possible. It is essential that 




leaving future expansion to be decided by later developments. Here again, 
foreign participation would prove most useful, especially if the foreign 
partner happens to be a large and well-known concern with established 
markets overseas. The government and the Industrial Bank will have to 
take an activé interest in these projects and it would be advisable to 
have the entire complex undertaken and managed by one large concern. 
72. A wide range of consumer goods both in the field of foods and 
household goods has been recommended in previous reports; and some of 
these recommendations have already been implemented while others have not 
presumably proved sufficiently attractive to encourage investors to 
consider them seriously. It is suggested that existing feasibility 
studies be reviewed by the Industrial Bank's new Research and Policy 
United (see paragraph above) with a view to shifting the emphasis 
from producing cheap and competitive products to producing quality goods 
largely intended for the more sophisticated markets of Western Europe and 
the United States. Better quality foodstuffs, craft goods, knitware, 
decorative furniture, etc., would obviously fail into this category. 
Besides quality, special attention will have to be devoted to marketing 
endeavour. This is particularly important since Panamanian goods will 
be unknown to Consumers and will need time to create an image, and an 
expensive distribution network will have to be created to bring them 
within the reach of consumers. Here again these industries will benefit 
much from integration; this will make the sales effort easier and 
distribution cost manageable. Or perhaps one national marketing agency 
may be created to assume the task of being Panama's super-salesman. 
73. As far as the home market is concerned, household goods including 
fabricated metals (e.g. garden, camp and dual purpose sleep and office 
furniture, agricultural implements as well as a wide variety of related 
items), appliances, electric bulbs, transistor radios, clothing, leather 
goods have all been attempted by other countries with varying degrees of 
success. Between them the IBRD report and that submitted by Messrs. 
George Fry and Associates lists some 30 items which fall within this 




examined by the Research and Policy Unit of the Industrial Bank0 Here 
again, association with overseas manufacturers should be considered 
wherever possible. Apart from the obvious technical advantages such an 
association would bring along with it, this arrangement is likely to 
reduce a considerable part of overhead cost such as the expenditure on 
design, research, marketing and management. Preference should be given 
to industries which will depend on domestic raw materials and which will 
be sustained by a sufficiently broad home market. 
74. In conclusion, it must be emphasised that economic development is 
a long and complex process. Industrialisation is only one of its 
components; so it will be wrong to equate the two, let alone to identify 
the process of development with the creation of a few basic industries 
or the provision of aid or encouragement to investment in the industrial 
sector. Government action should extend just as widely over the fields 
of agriculture, which will always constitute the back-bone of the economy, 
and services, where there remains substantial potential for expansion. 
No measures to encourage one sector alone, much less certain parts of one 
sector, can possibly provide the answer to Panama's present dilemma. 
Industrialisation should always be regarded as an integral part of an 
extensive plan of action which will pay dividends only when all its 
components have received the attention, determination and perseverance 
they deserve. 

